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Abstract: By means of extensive numerical simulations
we show that all the distinctive features of the minority game
introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997), are completely in-
dependent from the memory of the agents. The only crucial
requirement is that all the individuals must posses the same
information, irrespective of the fact that this information is
true or false.
Originally inspired by the El Farol problem stated by
Arthur in [1], it has been introduced in [2] a model system
for the adaptive evolution of a population of interacting
agents, the so called minority game. This is a toy model
where inductive, rather than deductive, thinking, in a
population of bounded rationality, gives rise to coopera-
tive phenomena.
The setup of the minority game is the following: N
agents have to choose at each time step whether to go
in room 0 or 1. Those agents who have chosen the less
crowded room (minority room) win, the other loose, so
that the system is intrinsically frustrated.
A crucial feature of the model is the way by which
agents choose. In order to decide in what room to go,
agents use strategies. A strategy is a choosing device,
that is an object that processes the outcomes of the win-
ning room in the last m time steps (each outcome being
0 or 1) and accordingly to this information prescribes in
what room to go the next step. The so-called memory
m defines 2m potential past histories (for instance, with
m = 2 there are four possible pasts, 11, 10, 01 and 00). A
strategy is thus formally a vector Rµ, with µ = 1, . . . , 2
m,
whose elements can be 0 or 1. The space Γ of the strate-
gies is an hypercube of dimension D = 2m and the total
number of strategies is 2D.
At the beginning of the game each agent draws ran-
domly a number s of strategies from the space Γ and
keeps them forever, as a genetic heritage. The problem
is now to fix which one, among these s strategies, the
agent is going to use 1. The rule is the following. During
the game the agent gives point to all his/her strategies
according to their potential success: at each time step a
strategy gets a point only if it has forecast the correct
winning room, regardless of having been actually used or
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1We will consider only the non-trivial case s > 1.
not. At a given time the agent chooses among his/her
s strategies the most successful one up to that moment
(i.e. the one with the highest number of points) and uses
it in order to choose the room. The adaptive nature of
the game relies in the time evolution of the best strategy
of each single agent.
In this way the game has a well defined deterministic
time evolution, which only depends on the initial distri-
bution of strategies and on the random initial string of
m bits necessary to start the game.
Among all the possible observables, a special role is
played by the variance σ of the attendance A in a given
room [2]. We can consider, for instance, room 0 and
define A(t) as the number of agents in this room at time
t. We have,
σ2 = lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
t0
dt′
(
A(t′)−
N
2
)2
, (1)
where N/2 is the average attendance in the room and t0
is a transient time after which the process is stationary
[2,3]. In all the simulations presented in this Letter it
has been taken t = t0 = 10, 000 for a maximum value of
N = 101 and it has been verified that the averages were
saturated over these times.
The importance of σ (called volatility in financial con-
text) is simple to understand: the larger is σ, the larger is
the global waste of resources by the community of agents.
Indeed, only with an attendance A as near as possible to
its average value there is the maximum distribution of
points to the whole population. Moreover, from a finan-
cial point of view, it is clear that a low volatility σ is of
great importance in order to minimize the risk.
If all the agents were choosing randomly, the varian-
ce would simply be σ2r = N/4. An important issue is
therefore: in what conditions is the variance σ smaller
than σr ? In other words, is it possible for a population
of selfish individuals to collectively behave in a better-
than-random way ? What has been found first in [3] is
that the volatility σ as a function of m has a remarkable
behaviour, since actually there is a regime where σ is
smaller than the random value σr. In this phase the col-
lective behaviour is such that less resources are globally
wasted by the population of agents. A deep understand-
ing of this feature is therefore important.
From the very definition of the model and from the
behaviour of σ(m) described above, it seems clear that
the memory m is a crucial quantity for the two following
1
reasons.
First, from a geometrical point of view, m defines the
dimension of the space of strategies Γ and therefore it
is related to the probability that strategies drawn ran-
domly by different agents could give similar predictions:
the larger ism, the bigger is Γ and the lower is the proba-
bility that different players have some strategies in com-
mon. Since the non-random nature of the game relies in
the presence of correlated choices, that is, exactly in the
possibility that different agents use the same strategies,
it follows that for very large m the game proceeds in a
random way [3–6] 2.
Secondly, m is supposed to be a real memory. Actual-
ly, the whole game is constructed around the role of m as
a memory: at time t agents use strategies which process
the last m events in the past. As a consequence of this,
a new minority room will come out and at time t + 1
there will be a new m-bits past which will differ from the
old one for the outcome at time t. Thus, agents, or bet-
ter, strategies, choose by remembering the last m steps
of time history, so that m is a natural time scale of the
system. Due to this, an explanation of the behaviour of
σ(m) has been proposed in [3], where the decay rate of
the time correlations in the system is compared and re-
lated to m, thus supporting the key interpretation of m
as a real memory. This memory role of m complicates
greatly the nature of the problem, since it induces an ex-
plicit dynamical feedback in the evolution of the system,
such that the process is not local in time.
The purpose of this Letter is to show that the memory
of the agents is irrelevant. We shall prove that there is
no need of an explicit time feedback, to obtain all the
distinctive features of the model.
In order to prove this statement we consider the same
model introduced in [2] and described above, but with
the following important difference: at each time step, the
past history is just invented, that is, a random sequence
of m bits is drawn, to play the role of a fake time history.
This is the information that all the agents process with
their best strategies to choose the room. As we are going
to show, this oblivious version of the model gives exactly
the same results as the original one, thus proving that
the role of m is purely geometrical.
In Fig.1, the variance σ as a function of m is plotted
both for the case with and without memory. The two
models give the same results, not only qualitatively, but
also quantitatively (see also the data of [3–6]). In parti-
cular, the minimum of σ as a function of m is found even
without memory and cannot therefore be related to it.
2This argument works at fixed number of agents N . Other-
wise the relevant variable will be 2m/N . We discuss this point
later.
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FIG. 1. Model without memory vs. model with memory.
The variance σ as a function of m for s = 2. The horizontal
line is the variance σr of the random case. The number of
agents is N = 101. Average over 100 samples. Errors bars
are shown only for the model without memory, while the line
just connects the points of the memory model.
The dependence of the whole function σ(m) on the
individual number of strategies s is another important
point. It has been shown for the first time in [4] that
the minimum of this curve is shallower the larger is the
value of s. In Fig.2 we show that this same phenomenon
occurs for the model without memory.
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FIG. 2. Model without memory. Variance σ as a function
of m, at different values of s, N = 101. Average over 100
samples. Lines are just a guide for the eye.
From a technical point of view, note that, once elimi-
nated the role of m as a memory, the only quantity in-
volved in the actual implementation of the model is D,
the dimension of the space of strategies Γ. Therefore, in-
stead of drawing a random sequence of m bits, it is much
easier to draw a random component µ ∈ [1, D] to mimic
the past history: each agent uses component µ of his/her
2
best strategy to choose the room. The main consequence
of this is that there is no need for being D = 2m, since
we can choose any integer value of D. In [5] it has been
introduced a method by which it is possible to consider
non-integer values of m in the model with memory. This
is useful, since it permits to study the shape of σ(m)
around its minimum, with a better resolution in m. In
the present context, it is trivial to consider non-integer
values of m, since we simply have m = log
2
D. In this
way results identical to [5] are obtained.
Once fixed s, let mc be the value of m where the mini-
mum of σ(m) occurs. In [3] it has been pointed out that
for m < mc the variance σ grows as N , where N is the
number of agents, while for m > mc it grows as N
1/2.
In Fig.3, σ as a function of N is plotted for the model
without memory. The same behaviour as in the model
with memory is found.
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FIG. 3. Model without memory. Variance σ as a function
of the number of agents N , for different values of m, at fixed
s = 2. Average over 10 samples. The full line is σ ∼ N , while
the dashed line is σ ∼ N1/2.
An interesting question is whether σ is a function of
a single scaling variable z constructed with m, N and s.
It has been shown in [3] that by considering as a scaling
variable z = 2m/N = D/N all the data for σ at various
m and N collapse on the same curve. In this case the rel-
evant parameter is thus the dimension D of Γ, over the
number N of playing strategies. On the other hand, it
has been proposed in [4] a different scaling variable, that
is z′ = 2 · 2m/sN = 2D/sN . In this way, the relevant
parameter would be the density on Γ of the total number
of strategies sN . In Fig.4 we plot σ2/N as a function of
z′, at different values of D, N and s, for the model with-
out memory. We see that the correct scaling parameter
is z and not z′, since the data with different values of s
collapse on different curves. The same result is obtained
if we perform the simulation with the memory (see [5]).
The two models give once again the same results. Note
from Fig.4 that the scaling is not perfect at very low val-
ues of z′, that is for very small D. This is just a trace of
the integer nature of the model.
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FIG. 4. Model without memory. Plot of σ2/N as a function
of the scaling parameter z′ = 2D/sN . The number of agents
N varies from N = 51 to N = 101, while D varies from D = 2
to D = 4096. The individual number of strategies s ranges
over two values s = 2 and s = 4. Average over 50 samples.
From what shown above it is reasonable to conclude
that, in order to obtain all the crucial features of the
minority game, the presence of an individual memory of
the agents is irrelevant. The parameter m still plays a
major role, but only for being related to the dimension
D = 2m of the strategies space Γ. A consequence of
this fact is that any attempt to explain the properties of
this model, relying on the role of m as a memory, can
hardly be correct. On the other hand, as already said,
the geometrical role of m remains. Indeed, some recent
attempts to give an analytic description of the model (see
[4,6]) are only grounded on geometrical considerations
about the distribution of strategies in the space Γ and go
therefore, in our opinion, in the correct direction.
The most important result of the present Letter is
the existence of a regime where the whole population of
agents still behaves in a better-than-random way, even if
the information they process is completely random, that
is wrong, if compared to the real time history. The cru-
cial thing is that everyone must possess the same infor-
mation. Indeed, if we invent a different past history for
each different agent, no coordination emerges at all and
the results are the same as if the agents were behaving
randomly (this can be easily verified numerically). In
other words, if each individual is processing a different
information, the features of the system are completely
identical to the random case, irrespective of the values of
m and s.
The conclusion is the following: the crucial property is
not at all the agents’ memory of the real time history, but
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rather the fact that they all share the same information,
whatever false or true this is. As a consequence, there is
no room in this model for any kind of forecasting of the
future based on the “understanding” of the past.
We hope this result to be useful for a future deeper
understanding of this kind of adaptive systems. Indeed,
before trying to explain the rich structure of a quite com-
plicated model, it is important in our opinion to clear up
what are the truly necessary ingredients of such a model
and what, on the contrary, is just an irrelevant complica-
tion, which can be dropped. In the case of the so-called
memory (or brain size, or intelligence), m, there also has
been a problem of terminology: given the original for-
mulation of the model, it seemed that the very nature
of a variable encoding the memory or the intelligence
of the agents, could warrant by itself a relevance to it
[2–8], relevance which, as we have seen, was not deserved.
Notwithstanding this, we consider the present model still
to be very interesting and far from being trivial.
Finally, let us note that the passage from a model with
memory to a model without memory, is equivalent to
substitute a deterministic, but very complicated system,
with a stochastic, but much simpler one, which neverthe-
less gives the same results as the original case and which
is therefore indistinguishable from it for all the practi-
cal purposes. The use of a stochastic/disordered model
to mimic a deterministic/ordered one, is similar in the
spirit to what happens in the context of glassy systems,
where some disordered models of spin glasses are often
used in order to have a better understanding of structural
glasses, which contain in principle no quenched disorder
[9].
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